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Abstract 
 
 
 
A growing number of studies have explored the influence of institution on the 
outcomes of disasters and accidents from the viewpoint of political economy. This 
paper focuses on the probability of the occurrence of disasters rather than disaster 
outcomes. Using panel data from 98 countries, this paper examines how public 
sector corruption is associated with the probability of technological disasters. It was 
found that public sector corruption raises the probability of technological disasters. 
This result is robust when endogeneity bias is controlled. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As shown in various historical records, the occurrence of disasters appears to 
inevitably influence social and economic conditions. In the field of social science, an 
increasing number of works have investigated the effect of natural disasters and 
associated outcomes. Recently, institution has been found to be associated with the 
outcome of disasters (Kahn 2005). For instance, damage of natural disasters depends in 
part on public sector corruption (Escaleras et al., 2007).1 Corruption, however, does not 
affect the probability of a natural disaster occurring because such a probability depends 
on natural conditions.2 In other words, corruption is important when we analyze how, 
and to what extent, to mitigate the damage caused by natural disasters. However, 
corruption is not relevant when we analyze how to prevent natural disasters. With 
regard to the interactions between politics and economics, investigations (Anbarci et al. 
2006) have shown that corruption increases the rate of fatal traffic accidents, 
suggesting that corruption is thought to have a sizable effect on the occurrence and 
outcome of accidents by human error. Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
influence of corruption on manmade disasters when considering a political economy 
mechanism. However, little is known about the effect of corruption on the probability of 
technological disasters; thus, it is a topic worth investigating. 
Corruption is considered to affect the probability of accidents and manmade disasters 
via various channels; a brief explanation follows. First, a key reason for market failure 
is information asymmetry between market demand and supply. An anticipated and 
necessary role of government is to attenuate this failure. In various industries, firms 
and individuals are obliged to obtain a license to commence a business to ensure a 
quality service is supplied. Public officials have the right to grant these firms and 
individuals such licenses. For instance, pilots are required by law to obtain a pilot 
license. Airplane companies are obliged by public officials to employ only pilots with 
such a license. For the purpose of reducing information asymmetry between airplane 
companies and customers, it is anticipated that public officials play an 
industry-regulating role to ensure flight safety. In reality, however, public officials have 
                                                   
1 Corruption in general is defined as the use of public office for private gains (Bardhan, 
1997). The main forms of corruption include bribes received by public officials, the 
embezzlement by public officials of resources that they are entrusted to administer, 
fraud in the form of manipulating information to further the personal interests of public 
officials, extortion, and favoritism (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001). 
2 Kahn (2005) provides evidence that area dummies, absolute value of latitude, and 
land area are important determinants in the occurrence of natural disasters, whereas 
GDP per capita is not considered to be a determinant. 
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an incentive to pursue their own self-interest: these public officials may accept bribes 
from firms and individuals to ignore various regulations.3  
Assuming that the qualifying standards for obtaining a license are effective in 
determining the techniques, skills, and quality of pilots, these will deteriorate when 
pilots illegitimately receive their pilot license.4 Individuals make a decision regarding 
how to obtain the license by considering whether the cost of illegitimately purchasing 
the license is lower than the cost of obtaining license legitimately. The corruption of 
public officials results in the ―price of a license‖ in the illegitimate market to fall below 
the cost of passing a legitimate qualifying standard for licensing. Accordingly, 
individuals will purchase the license illegitimately. Consequently, the safety of 
airplanes declines, and in turn the probability of airplane accidents increases. Evidence 
regarding the relationship between corruption and traffic accidents (Anbarci 2006) 
supports this inference. The more corrupt a public official is, the cheaper the cost of 
purchasing a license and the lower the quality and skill of drivers (Bertland et al. 2007). 
Corruption reduces the incentive to train for positions in which technological devices 
are employed. Inevitably, accidents are more likely to occur. As with airplane pilots and 
car drivers, this inference holds true, in general, within any industries where licenses 
are required. 
The second reason for market failure is that corruption weakens existing 
infrastructure (Vito and Davoodi 1997; Vito 2002; Vito and Davoodi 2002). The rate of 
return of projects, as calculated using cost–benefit analysis, is a criterion for project 
selection. In reality, however, corruption motivates bureaucrats to direct public 
expenditure via channels that make it easier to collect bribes. Thus, the productivity of 
the project is not taken into account when the investment project is selected, leading to 
the distortion of resource allocation. This causes a bias towards large-scale construction 
projects rather than maintenance expenditure. Thus, corruption reduces the public 
spending that is required to keep the existing physical infrastructure in a good and safe 
condition. A previous study (Vito & Davoodi 1997) found, using regression analysis, that 
corruption reduced the percentage of total paved roads in good condition, and increased 
the percentage of electricity power system losses over total power output. Based on 
                                                   
3 Intuitively, there is a wide range of causal factors through which corruption may 
increase the risk of failure. It is plausible that corruption decreases the incentive to 
adopt safety measures when the cost of obtaining a particular authorization with a 
bribe is lower than the cost of providing the safety measures.  
4 The licensing hypothesis requires that safety regulations be in place. However, 
corruption can reduce the level of regulation. This corruption effect appears dependent 
on the degree of democracy. As explained in the section 3, country dummies are included 
as independent variables to control the degree of democracy. 
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those results, the authors concluded that corruption reduces expenditure on 
maintenance and operations, resulting in low-quality infrastructure (Vito and Davoodi 
1997; Vito 2002; Vito and Davoodi 2002). In addition, corruption hampers economic 
growth (Mauro 1995) and therefore reduces per capital income, and as a result 
consumers purchase inferior products.5 It seems plausible that the deterioration of 
physical infrastructure increases the likelihood of transport or industrial accidents. 
Corruption inevitably increases the probability of accidents, resulting in manmade 
disasters. 
These inferences lead me to propose the hypothesis that a corrupt public sector 
raises the probability of technological accidents and therefore disasters. This paper uses 
panel data from 98 countries to explore the influence of corruption on technological 
disasters. The key finding is that a technological disaster is more likely to occur in a 
country with greater levels of corruption in the public sector. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 proposes the hypothesis 
to be tested; data and methods used are explained in section 3; section 4 discusses the 
results of the estimations; and the final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Related literature  
Controversy exists regarding the effect of natural disasters on economic growth. 
Cross-country analysis has been used to show that natural disasters have a positive 
effect on economic growth by enhancing human capital accumulation (Skidmore & Toya 
2002). In contrast, county-level data from the United States have been used to suggest 
that economic growth rates fall, on average, by 0.45% points after a disaster, and that 
nearly 28% of the growth effect is due to the emigration of wealthier citizens (Strobl 
2011). In addition, it has been asserted that (Cuaresma et al. 2008) the effect of natural 
disasters on growth differs between developing and developed countries. Further 
studies have also investigated the influence of natural disasters on welfare (Sawada 
2007; Luechinger & Saschkly 2009). With regard to deaths caused by natural disasters, 
GDP per capita, economic openness, the development of financial sectors, and human 
capital formation are all negatively associated with such deaths, especially in less 
developed countries (Toya & Skidmore 2007).6  
                                                   
5 In the regression estimations in this paper, per capita income is included as an 
independent variable and thus the income effect is controlled for. Hence, the indirect 
effect of corruption on disasters through income level is not captured in the coefficient of 
corruption.  
6 Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) suggested that the relationship between GDP levels 
and the damage caused by natural disasters takes an inverted U shape, rather than 
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The level of damage caused by natural disasters has been explained not only by 
economic factors but also by political and institutional factors.7 Low-quality governance 
and income inequality increase the death rate in a natural disaster, whereas democracy 
and social capital reduce the number of deaths (Anbarci et al. 2005; Kahn 2005; 
Escaleras et al. 2007; Yamamura 2010).8 Government corruption is thought to be an 
important measure that captures the quality of governance and so plays a critical role 
when natural disasters occur.9  Using China‘s 2008 earthquake in Sichuan as an 
example, the death toll from the earthquake reached approximately 70,000, with close 
to 10,000 school children confirmed dead after the collapse of 7,000 classrooms (Wong, 
2008); for example, a government school built in 1975, and only renovated once in 1981, 
collapsed in the earthquake (Wong, 2008).10 Parents of the deceased school children 
protested about the poor construction of the school. In response, local officials tried to 
buy the silence of the parents by offering them money if they signed a contract agreeing 
not to raise the construction issue again. In addition, Chinese news organizations have 
also been told by the central government not to conduct any reports on the schools. 
Chinese people suspect that government corruption is the reason behind the collapse of 
so many schools in the quake. Turning now to the recent natural disasters in Haiti and 
Japan, more than 200,000 lost their lives in Haiti‘s 2010 earthquake (The United 
Nations 2010), and approximately 15,000 people died in Japan‘s 2011 earthquake and 
                                                                                                                                                     
being monotonically negative. 
7 Media is also considered to be a critical determinant of the damage caused by natural 
disasters (Eisensee and Strӧmberg, 2007).  
8 Disasters have both direct and indirect detrimental effects on economic conditions. 
One indirect effect is the distortion of allocation through political economy channels. 
Garret and Sobel (2003) examined the flow of Federal Emergency Management 
Administration money and found that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated 
politically rather than by need. Sobel and Leeson (2006) explored the outcome of 
Hurricane Katrina and argued that it is difficult for a centralized agency to make the 
best use of dispersed information to coordinate the demand for available supplies. The 
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was magnified because of a massive 
governmental failure (Shughart II, 2006). Congleton (2006) pointed out that the cause 
of the catastrophe that followed Katrina can be attributed to an interaction between the 
geographical features of New Orleans and the failure of the New Orleans levee system. 
9 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that corruption causes public 
finance to be ineffective in the enhancement of economic development (Hillman, 2004).  
10 Golden and Picci (2005) argued that the activities surrounding public works 
construction are the classic locus of illegal monetary activities between public officials 
and business. They also developed an objective measure of corruption. The measure 
calculates the difference between the physical quantities of public infrastructure and 
the cumulative price that the government pays for public capital stocks. Where the 
difference is greater between the money spent and the existing physical 
infrastructure—indicating that more money has been siphoned off in corrupt 
transactions—higher levels of corruption exist. 
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tsunami (Sawada and Kodera 2011). According to the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Japan‘s corruption score sits around 4 and Haiti‘s at 1.5, which indicates that 
Japan‘s public sector is less corrupt than Haiti‘s. Therefore, the difference in the 
number of deaths in Haiti and Japan may be due, in part, to the degree of corruption in 
those governments. 
Owing in part to a lack of data on corruption, an empirical analysis of corruption did 
not exist prior to the 1990s, although there are number of classical anecdotal and 
theoretical works (Leff 1964; Lui 1985; Shleifer & Vishny 1993).11 Seminal works from 
the 1990s (Mauro 1995), which empirically examined the effect of corruption, and the 
compilation of data on corruption have led the way for researchers to empirically 
investigate the political and economic outcomes of public sector corruption (e.g., Glaeser 
and Saks 2006; Apergis et al. 2010; Dreher & Schneider 2010; Escaleras et al. 2010; 
Jong and Bogmans 2011, Johnson et.al. 2011; Swaleheen 2011).  
 
3. Data and methods 
 
3.1. Data  
Data regarding the number of technological disasters from 1900 to 2010 were sourced 
from EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database).12 In this paper, however, a proxy for 
public sector corruption was available from 1984 as explained later in the paper, and as 
such I used data from 1984 to 2010 on the number of technological disasters.13  
Definitions and the basic statistics for the variables used in this paper are presented 
in Table 1.14 The mean value of the number of technological disasters is 1.70 and its 
standard deviation is 4.76, which is nearly three times larger than the mean value. The 
maximum and minimum values of the number of technological disasters are 71 and 0, 
respectively, indicating a significant gap. Table 2 shows more detailed statistics 
                                                   
11 Jain (2001) provided a literature review of classic research and introduced the 
current debate among researchers. 
12 According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, technological 
disasters can be categorized into three categories: industrial, miscellaneous, and 
transport accidents. http://www.emdat.be/explanatory-notes (accessed on June 15, 
2011). 
13 The number of technological disasters was sourced from the International Disaster 
Database. http://www.emdat.be (accessed on June 1, 2011). 
14 In addition to data regarding the number of technological disasters, EM-DAT also 
provides various indexes for damage caused by disasters such as estimated damage 
costs (US$), number of homeless, number of injured, and number of deaths. This paper, 
however, focuses on the determinants of accidents rather than the determinants of 
damage. Hence, indexes for damage caused by disasters are not used in this paper.  
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regarding the number of technological disasters and the frequency of technological 
disasters. Interestingly, 56.5% of technological disasters had a value of 0 and 18.4% just 
1. Considering them jointly suggests that technological disasters are over-dispersed, a 
situation that is often observed in the case of disasters and accidents (e.g., Kahn 2005; 
Anbarci et al. 2006; Escaleras et al. 2007).  
With respect to the proxy for corruption, an ICRG corruption index and World Bank 
corruption index are used. My primary measure of public sector corruption, the ICRG 
corruption index, was taken from the ICRG and contains data on 146 countries over a 
27-year period (1984–2010). The ICRG is assembled by the Political Risk Service Group. 
The ICRG corruption index has the advantage of covering a longer period than the 
alternative measure (the World Bank corruption index). The ICRG corruption index 
values range from 0 to 6; larger values indicate less corruption. According to the ICRG, 
the most common form of business corruption is financial corruption in the form of 
demands for special payments and bribes connected with licenses. The ICRG corruption 
index captures financial corruption. With regard to the alternative measure of 
corruption, the World Bank constructed World Governance Indicators, which provides 
data for the World Bank corruption index on 213 countries over a 14-year period 
(1996–2009). 15  In comparison with the ICRG corruption index, the World Bank 
corruption index has the advantage of including a larger number of countries, although 
over a shorter time period.16 The World Bank corruption index captures perceptions 
regarding the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ―capturing‖ corruption by the elite and 
private interests (Kaufman et al. 2010). According to data originally provided by the 
World Bank, the World Bank corruption index ranges from 0 to 100, where the larger 
values suggest less corruption. In this paper, with the aim of standardizing the values of 
the proxy for corruption, I converted the World Bank corruption index to have a value 
range of 0 to 6. This change enables me to compare the effect of the ICRG corruption 
index on the number of technological disasters, and that of the World Bank corruption 
index on the same. As exhibited in Table 1, the mean value and the standard deviation 
for the ICRG corruption index are 3.19 and 1.46, respectively. In addition, the mean 
                                                   
15 Available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on June 
1, 2011). 
16 Transparency International also provides the proxy for corruption. This data covers 
1995 to 2010, which is a shorter period than the ICRG corruption index. The number of 
countries included in the data from Transparency International is smaller than in the 
World Bank corruption index. That is, the data from Transparency International are not 
as helpful. Therefore, this paper does not use those data in estimations. 
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value and the standard deviation for the World Bank corruption index are 3.17 and 1.83, 
respectively. This shows that the values for the ICRG corruption index are similar to 
those of the World Bank corruption index. As shown in Appendix 1, the countries used 
in the estimations change depending on whether the ICRG corruption index or the 
World Bank corruption index is used. 
GDP (GDP per capita), population, government size, openness, and rate of industry 
(value-added of industry/GDP) were collected from the World Bank (2010). The 
available data for these variables covered 1960 to 2008. Thus, the data used in the 
estimations do not include 2009, and as such I was unable to use 2009 data in the 
regression, although there were 2009 data available regarding the number of 
technological disasters, and in the ICRG corruption and World Bank corruption indexes. 
 
3.2. Basic methods 
 
To examine the hypothesis raised previously, this paper uses a negative binominal 
model. The estimated function takes the following form:  
Number of disasters it = 0 + 1 ICRG corruption (or World Bank corruption) it + 
2GDPit + 3Populationit + 4Government size it + ５Openness it + 6 Rate of 
industry it + ui + mt +εit,             (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is Number of disasters it in country i, for year t.  
represents the regression parameters, vui the unobservable time-invariant feature of 
country i, and mt the unobservable year effects of year t.17 The effects of ui are 
controlled for by including country dummies, and the effects of mt are controlled for by 
including year dummies. εit represents the error term. Therefore, the specification is 
considered to be a two-way fixed model. When ICRG corruption is used as the proxy for 
the degree of corruption, it includes data on 86 countries, from 1984 to 2008. In contrast, 
when World Bank corruption is used as a proxy for the degree of corruption, the data 
cover 92 countries, from 1996 to 2008. Number of disasters is count data and does not 
take a negative value. Compared with OLS or a Probit model, the Poisson model is more 
appropriate in this situation for the estimation. This is because the estimation results 
for count data will suffer bias in OLS where dependent values are allowed to take both 
                                                   
17 As indicated by Figure 1, there are some outliers. In this case, per capital 
technological disasters are a likely alternative measure and so could be used as a 
dependent variable. However, in all estimations, population has been already included 
as an independent variable. This means that the scale of each county has been 
controlled for. That is, the outlier bias is, to a certain extent, alleviated. 
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negative and positive values.18 Furthermore, the dependent variable must take 0 or 1 
in a Probit model. A Probit model is more suitable to analyze qualitative data than 
count data.  
However, in the Poisson model, it is assumed that mean of a dependent variable is 
equal to its variance. As discussed in subsection 3.1, Number of disasters is 
over-dispersed and its variance is large. The use of the Poisson model here causes a 
downward bias and inflates z-statistics, and as such, the negative binominal model is 
preferred (Wooldridge 2002, Ch. 19). The negative binominal model is applied for 
empirical analysis to examine the effect of natural disasters in existing works (e.g., 
Anbarci et al. 2006; Escaleras et al. 2007; Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008), because the 
damage caused by natural disasters is characterized by over-dispersion. In line with 
previous literature, the negative binominal model is used in this paper, although this 
paper focuses on the number of technological disasters rather than the resulting 
damage. 
If the hypothesis is supported, ICRG corruption (or World Bank corruption) will take 
the negative sign. Figures 1(a) and (b) demonstrate the relationship between a country‘s 
average Number of disasters from 1984 to 2008 and a country‘s average corruption 
(ICRG corruption) from 1984 to 2008. Figure 1(a) shows that Number of disasters is 
negatively related to corruption, although outliers (China, India, and Nigeria), which 
experience on average at least 10 times more technological disasters, appear to affect 
the relationship. As presented in Table 2, the number of technological disasters is less 
than 10 for 97% of observations. Therefore, outliers with an average Number of 
disasters larger than 10 are removed from the sample, and the relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 1(b). A cursory examination of Figure 1(b) reveals that the negative 
relationship between Number of disasters and corruption continues to be observed. The 
findings demonstrated in Figures 1(a) and (b) are congruent to the hypothesis. In 
addition, I divided the sample into less corrupt countries whose ICRG corruption is 
larger than 3 (ICRG corruption ≥ 0) and more corrupt countries whose ICRG corruption 
is smaller than 3 (ICRG corruption < 0). The incidence rate of less corrupt countries is 
1.17, whereas that of more corrupt countries is 2.58. I defined the exposed group as the 
less corrupt countries. Accordingly, the incidence rate ratio is 0.45, which means that 
technological disasters are less likely to occur in less corrupt countries compared with 
more corrupt countries. Furthermore, I divided the sample into larger countries with 
                                                   
18 When y is a dependent variable, ―for strictly positive variables, we often use the 
natural log transformation, log(y), and use a linear model. This approach is not possible 
in interesting count data applications, where y takes on the value zero for nontrivial 
fraction of the population.‖ (Wooldridge 2002, 645). 
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populations over 100 million and smaller countries with populations under 100 million. 
The incidence rate ratio is 0.47 for larger countries and 0.58 for smaller countries. It 
follows then that technological disasters are less likely to occur in less corrupt countries, 
which is observed not only in the smaller countries sample but also in the larger 
countries sample. A closer examination of the influence of corruption on Number of 
disasters is explored using a regression analysis in section 4. 
With regard to control variables, and following Kahn (2005) who examined the 
determinants of deaths from technological disasters, GDP and Population are included 
to capture basic economic conditions. GDP is considered to reflect the degree of 
economic development within a country. Higher levels of technology are more likely to 
be found in developed countries. As a consequence, there are greater preventative 
measures against technological disasters, resulting in a lower probability of these 
occurring. Therefore, GDP is expected to take the negative sign. In contrast, technology 
is less likely to be used in less developed countries because technology-intensive sectors 
have not yet been well established. If this holds true, technology is less likely to be used 
and so the probability of industrial disasters is lower in less developed countries. 
Therefore, technological disasters are more likely to occur in developed countries.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, China and India experience a far larger number of 
disasters and can be considered as outliers. The number of technological disasters 
appears to depend on country size because the frequency of using technology depends on 
the size of the demand for that technology. Population is included to capture the effect of 
country size. The predicted sign of the coefficient of population is positive because the 
demand for technology is positively associated with population when all other things 
are considered equal. Further, country dummies and year dummies are included to 
address the outlier problem. For the purpose of controlling for the different effects 
caused by the economic structure, Rate of industry (value-added of industry/GDP) is 
used. Higher rates of industry lead to higher rates of technological disasters. Thus, Rate 
of industry is predicted to take the positive sign.  
The presence of government is captured by Government size. Even after controlling 
for quality of government with ICRG corruption (or World Bank corruption), 
government appears to envelop the private sector. Technological disasters in the private 
sector result in a decrease in the demand for goods and therefore a decrease in profits. 
Thus, private firms have an incentive to avoid disasters so as to not reduce profits. As a 
result, private firms make various investments in accident prevention. In contrast to 
the private sector, governments do not have such an incentive, leading to a higher 
probability that a technological disaster will occur in the public sector. In light of the 
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above, it is possible to infer that Government size increases the probability of disasters 
and so takes the positive sign. Openness is considered to reflect the importance of 
technology via trade. Openness appears to have the opposite effect as follows: importing 
technology increases the frequency of using technology, thus raising the probability of 
disasters. In contrast, imported technology is accompanied by disaster prevention 
measures, reducing the possibility of disasters. Therefore, the sign for Openness 
depends on whether the positive effect outweighs the negative. 
 
3.3. Estimation based on 5-year-average data  
Potential time series issues should be taken into account. There is a simultaneous 
relationship between corruption and disasters when yearly data with no lags are used to 
predict disasters. A simultaneous relationship is not consistent with the causality 
suggested earlier. Serial autocorrelation is often a problem in panel regressions of this 
type and would be expected to bias the estimated standard errors downwards (Bertand 
et al., 2004). To alleviate these problems, I also conducted estimations of alternative 
specifications in which 5-year-average data were used. ICRG corruption data cover 27 
years, while the World Bank corruption data only cover 14 years. Hence, the period 
covered by the World Bank data is too short to be used for the 5-year-average estimation. 
Therefore, only ICRG corruption data are used. Five-year-average disasters are 
calculated in each period: 1984–1988, 1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2003, and 
2004–2008.  
 
3.4. IV Poisson method to control for endogeneity bias 
―Public sector corruption is commonly known to be highly correlated with … omitted 
institutional factors‖ (Escaleras et al. 2007, p. 219). Thus, ICRG corruption (or World 
Bank corruption) is regarded as an endogenous variable, causing the estimation results 
to suffer from bias. The inclusion of country dummies controls for unobserved 
country-specific time-invariant features, which is represented as ui in Equation (1). This 
allows ui to be arbitrarily related to the observable ICRG corruption (or World Bank 
corruption) (Wooldridge 2002, 265–266). That is, the inclusion of country dummies 
attenuates the endogeneity bias. In addition, for the purpose of controlling for bias, I 
used the Instrumental Variables Poisson Model (IV Poisson model)19. The first-stage 
                                                   
19 An instrumental variables negative binominal model is more appropriate. However, a 
method such as this has not been developed. The IV Poisson model is considered to be 
the second-best model and so is used in this paper. For the estimation, I used the IV 
Poisson model procedure outlined in Stata. I thank a referee for his/her suggestion to 
use the IV Poisson model. 
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regression, in the form of Equation (2), is estimated with ICRG corruption as the 
dependent variable:  
ICRG corruptionit = β0 + β1 French legal origin dummy i + β2 British legal origin 
dummy i + β3 Share of Catholic i + β4 GDPit + β5 Populationit + β6 Government sizeit 
+ β7 Opennessit + β8 Rate of industryit + mt + sit.             (2) 
 
Kahn (2005) used historical settler mortality rates as an instrument for institutional 
quality when he explored the determinants of damage from natural and technological 
disasters. I use a similar strategy for my choice of instrumental variables. However, the 
size of the sample reduced dramatically when historical morality rates are used because 
the data are only available for 36 countries. Hence, I used other historical data as 
instrumental variables so as to not reduce the sample size. Existing literature has 
clearly stated that institutional factors such as legal origin, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
religion determine the level of corruption (e.g., Treisman 2000; Paldam 2001; Djanskov 
et al. 2003; Serra 2006; Gokcekus 2008; Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008; Becker et al., 
2009).20 In this paper, I use French legal origin dummy, British legal origin dummy and 
Share of Catholic (percentage of the population that is Catholic in 1980) as 
instrumental variables.21 French legal origin dummy, British legal origin dummy, and 
Share of Catholic were sourced from earlier research (La Porta et al. 1999).22  
It has been observed in previous studies (Treisman 2000; Serra 2006) that the public 
sector is more inclined to be corrupt in countries of French legal origin that are now 
regarded as civil law countries, whereas the public sector is less inclined to be corrupt in 
British legal origin countries that are now regarded as common law countries. 
Pre-reform Christians have been previously defined as including Catholics, and 
Orthodox and other ‗Old‘ churches (Paldam 2001). It has been suggested that the public 
sector is more likely to be corrupt in the countries where Pre-reform Christians are 
dominant (Paldam 2001). If this holds true, then Share of Catholic is negatively 
associated with ICRG corruption. These instrumental variables are time-invariant and 
are removed when country dummies are included. Therefore, the country dummies were 
not incorporated in the two-stage estimations although year dummies are included in 
all estimations. In addition to Equation (2), an alternative specification is provided to 
                                                   
20 Freille et al. (2007) suggested that political and economic influences on the media 
were strongly related to corruption. 
21 Previous works generally used the percentage of Protestants to examine corruption. 
In this paper, however, these data are not used because they did not create a good fit 
with the estimated model when used as an independent variable. 
22 It is available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
(Accessed on May 1, 2011). 
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check for robustness, expressed as: 
 
ICRG corruption (or World Bank corruption)it = η0 + η1 GDPit + η2 Populationit + η3 
Government sizeit + η4 Opennessit + η5 Rate of industryit + η1 French legal origin 
dummy i * mt + γ2 British legal origin dummy i * mt + γ3 Share of Catholic i*mt + ui 
+ sit.                                                               (3) 
In Equation (3), η represents the scalar while γ is the vector. Legal origin dummies 
and Share of Catholic disappeared in the equation (because time-invariant features 
such as Legal origin dummies and Share of Catholic are controlled by mt) although 
those that interacted with the country dummies are included.  
While Legal freedom and Catholic are time-invariant, the dependent variables in the 
first and second stages vary with time. Choosing time-invariant variables as 
instruments cannot be justified if the time-variation in the predicted corruption stems 
from the potentially endogenous time-varying variables. However, more appropriate 
instruments with time-variant feature are not available. Time-invariant characteristics 
are considered to have different influences on corruption because the role of a 
time-invariant feature changes according to socio-economic circumstances. 
Socio-economic circumstances appear to change over long-term periods rather than in 
the short term. Therefore, in the estimation based on 5-year-average data, I attempted 
to control for potentially endogenous time-varying variables by including time-invariant 
instrumental variables that interact with period dummies.23 More precisely, there are 
five periods in the ICRG corruption data: 1984–1988, 1989–1993, 1994–1998, 
1999–2003, and 2004–2008. Instrumental variables interact with period dummies such 
as 1989–1993 dummy, 1994–1998 dummy, 1999–2003 dummy, and 2004–2008 dummy. 
The base period is 1984–1988. The ICRG corruption index data cover 27 years, and 
therefore socio-economic circumstances are considered to have changed during this 
period. Hence, the ICRG corruption data, from which the 5-year-average disasters are 
calculated, are suitable for the IV Poisson estimation. In contrast, the World Bank 
corruption data are not used in the IV Poisson estimation because the data span only 14 
years.  
As argued above, the choice of instrumental variables is based on evidence provided 
by previous studies. However, it is possible that the estimation results will vary 
                                                   
23 One would think that institutional factors may matter and should be included as 
independent variables in Equation (1) rather than used as instruments in Equation (2). 
However, in Equation (1) the time-invariant features are captured by country dummies, 
and therefore instrumental variables such as the legal origin dummies and the proxy for 
religion are removed.  
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according to the sets of variables used. In other words, probably thanks to some 
arbitrary combination of instrumental variables, the expected results are likely to be 
obtained. For a robustness check, it is necessary to conduct estimations using various 
combinations of instrumental variables. In this paper, three combinations were used in 
the estimations.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Results of negative binominal model 
The estimation results of the negative binominal model are set out in Table 3. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the results when the ICRG corruption index is used as a 
dependent variable, and columns (3) and (4) show the results when the World Bank 
corruption index is used. In columns (1) and (3), country dummies are included as 
independent variables. In columns (2) and (4), both country and year dummies are 
included.  
I will now discuss the results shown in Table 3. Consistent with my prediction, the 
coefficients of ICRG corruption take the negative sign in columns (1) and (2) and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The absolute values of the coefficients are 
between 0.13 and 0.09 in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The coefficients of World 
Bank corruption also take the negative sign and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level in columns (3) and (4). The absolute values of the coefficients are 0.22. The effects 
of World Bank corruption index are approximately two times larger than those of ICRG 
corruption index. However, both results are in line with the prediction, implying that 
the effects of corruption are robust with an alternative index. With respect to control 
variables, GDP yields a significant negative sign in all columns. This result implies that 
economic development reduces the possibility of technological disasters after controlling 
for institutional factors captured by country dummies. As for the results of the other 
control variables, Population, Government size, Openness and Rate of industry, in most 
cases they exhibit statistical significance in columns (1) and (2). In contrast, they are 
not statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). This may be explained by the sample 
size of columns (3) and (4), which at 1,035 is approximately half that of columns (1) and 
(2). The focus of the results is on the country and year dummies shown in column (2). 
The coefficients of Government size and Openness take the negative sign and are 
statistically significant. This implies that Government size and Openness reduce the 
incidence of technological disasters. In contrast, the sign of the coefficient of Rate of 
industry is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, a rise in the rate 
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of industry leads to an increase in technological disasters.  
I now turn to the results for the 5-year-average disasters presented in Table 4. ICRG 
corruption continues to take the negative sign and be statistically significant in columns 
(1) and (2). A change in socio-economic condition is thought to have a significant effect 
on the results. Accordingly, focus is given to those results in column (2), where both 
country and year dummies are included. The absolute value of ICRG corruption is 0.21, 
which is more than two times larger than column (2) in Table 3. GDP and Government 
size also continue to yield a significant negative sign in column (2). In addition, Rate of 
industry continues to take the positive sign and be statistically significant in column 
(2). 
The results from Tables 3 and 4 show that both Corruption and GDP reduce the 
number of disasters, and that these results did not vary using the different data sets. 
 
4.2. Results of IV Poisson model 
The results of the IV Poisson estimation are exhibited in Table 5. In columns (1)–(3), 
the instrumental variables are the interactions between the institutional variables and 
period dummies as follows: column (1), interaction term between French and period 
dummies, interaction term between British legal origin dummies and period dummies, 
and interaction term between Share of Catholic and period dummies; column (2), 
interaction term between French and period dummies, interaction term between British 
legal origin dummies and period dummies; and column (3), interaction term between 
share of Catholic and period dummies. 
In columns (4)–(6), country dummies are included to control for unobservable country 
specific characteristics.24 Institutional variables are used as instrumental variables. 
Country dummies are not included, while period dummies are included. In this 
specification, institutional effects are not captured by country dummies and so can be 
used as instrumental variables. The sets of instrumental variables are as follows: 
column (1), French and British legal origin dummies, and Share of Catholic are a set of 
institutional variables; column (2), French and British legal origin dummies; and 
column (3), Share of Catholic.   
Table 5 shows that ICRG corruption yields the predicted negative sign and is 
statistically significant in all estimations. This suggests that the results of corruption 
exhibited in Tables 3 and 4 are robust even after controlling for endogeneity bias. In 
addition, its absolute values in columns (1)–(3) are larger than those in columns (4)–(6). 
                                                   
24 Period dummies are not included because the estimation does not reach convergence 
if period dummies are included. 
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This may be explained in part by the fact that controlling country-specific effects 
increases the effects of corruption on the number of disasters. Furthermore, the 
absolute values in columns (1)–(3) are 7–10 times larger than the results of ICRG 
corruption presented in column (2) of Table 4. This shows that controlling for 
endogeneity bias increases the magnitude of the corruption effects. 
With respect to the other control variables, the coefficient of GDP takes the negative 
sign in columns (1)–(3), while it takes the positive sign in columns (4)–(6). With the 
exception of column (1), GDP is statistically significant at the 1% level. I interpret the 
results for GDP as suggesting that GDP captures the level of technology required to 
prevent accidents when unobservable country-specific effects are controlled. This is 
consistent with the results for GDP shown in Tables 3 and 4. Population yields the 
positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level with the exception of column 
(1). This implies that, as predicted, an increase in demand for technology leads to an 
increase in the frequency of using technology. As a consequence, the number of 
technological disasters increased. It is surprising to observe that Government size 
yields the negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1)–(3), 
and it produces the positive sign in columns (4)–(6) and is statistically significant in 
columns (4) and (6). Size of government reduces the probability of technological 
accidents when public sector corruption and country fixed effects are controlled for. In 
other words, Government size contributes to the reduction of technological accidents 
when the degree of public sector corruption and other time-invariant features are 
controlled for. From this, I derive the argument that a large government is positively 
associated with public sector corruption and that Government size increases the 
number of technological disasters through public sector corruption. The coefficients of 
Openness take the negative sign in all estimations and are statistically significant in 
columns (1), (4), (5), and (6), and not in columns (2) and (3). Hence, the effect of 
Openness is not as obvious. As discussed earlier, there are both positive effects (e.g., 
imported technology accompanied by disaster prevention measures) and negative 
effects (e.g., imports increase the frequency of technology use). My interpretation of this 
situation is that the negative effect is considered to neutralize the positive effect. Rate 
of industry yields the positive sign and is statistically significant in columns (4)–(6). In 
contrast, it yields the negative sign in columns (2) and (3) even though it is not 
statistically significant. Controlling for country-specific features removes the influence 
of Rate of industry, which is not consistent with the results of Table 3 and 4. Hence, the 
effect of Rate of industry is not conclusive.  
The results shown in Tables 3–5 and discussed so far strongly support the hypothesis 
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that corruption increases the probability of technological disasters. Thus, institutional 
quality plays a crucial role in determining the probability of manmade technological 
disasters, and should therefore be taken into account when mechanisms regarding 
manmade disasters are explored. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
Disasters have a tremendous impact on economic and political conditions, even in 
modern society. Increasingly, researchers are paying greater attention to the issue of 
disasters and a growing number of works are attempting to ascertain the determinants 
of the damage caused by natural disasters. The probability of a natural disaster 
occurring, however, depends on geographical features rather than economic or political 
factors. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of social science to prevent natural disasters. 
In contrast, manmade disasters, such as technological disasters, appear to be affected 
by institutions formed via long-term interactions between individuals. For instance, 
previous literature has provided evidence that public sector corruption influences 
economic condition via various channels. It has also been suggested (Escaleras et al. 
2007) that public sector corruption results in increases in fatalities caused by natural 
disasters. This claim is supported by further evidence that the rate of traffic fatalities is 
also influenced by corruption (Anbarci et al. 2006). However, there is little information 
regarding the relationship between public sector corruption and the probability of 
manmade disasters. Thus, this paper attempts to investigate how corruption influences 
the probability of technological disasters, and the extent of that influence, using panel 
data from 98 countries from 1984 to 2008.  
The major finding is that public sector corruption increases the probability of 
technological disasters. The result does not change even when country dummies are 
included or endogeneity bias is controlled for. Thus, it can be argued that the higher the 
level of corruption within a public sector, the higher the risk of industrial, transport, or 
other accidents. These technological accidents occur less frequently than traffic 
accidents; however, they cause greater economic and social loss. As a result, individuals 
change their behavior regarding risk. Therefore, the roles of both risk-coping behavior 
and the insurance market will change with regard to corruption. Corruption is believed 
to impede the function of the market. Thus, an indirect detrimental effect of corruption 
is that it reduces social welfare. This indirect effect of corruption needs to be taken into 
account, although few researchers have done so. An analysis of risk-coping behavior and 
the insurance market is important when the effects of disasters are required to be 
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considered (Sawada and Shimizutani 2007; 2008;). 
  The probability of technological disasters is explored in this paper. However, the 
effect of public sector corruption on the damage (and its extent) caused by technological 
disasters was not included in the scope of this study. Jointly analyzing the probability 
and damage caused by technological disasters would provide useful evidence for policy 
making. Furthermore, this paper used aggregated-level data for estimations. Thus, a 
detailed individual-level analysis was not conducted. Accordingly, how individual 
behavior relates to manmade disasters with regard to institutional conditions requires 
future investigation. To this end, field (or laboratory) experiments are desirable. 
Furthermore, aside from corruption, other institutional factors appear to affect the 
probability of manmade disasters. Thus, the effects of various institutional factors on 
the probability of manmade disasters should be examined. These remaining issues 
require further investigation in future studies. 
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(a) Full sample 
 
 
(b) Outliers (number of technological disasters is larger than 10) are excluded. 
Figure 1. Association between corruption (CORR_ICRG) and number of technological 
disasters
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variable Detailed definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Number of 
disasters 
Number of technological disasters 1.70 4.76 71 0 
   Independent variables     
ICRG corruption 
index 
Corruption index of international country risk guide 
(ICRG). 
3.19 1.46 6 0 
World Bank 
corruption index 
Corruption index of World Bank. 
 
3.17 1.83 6 0 
GDP GDP per capita (thousand US$) 
 
7.46 10.0 56.3 0.06 
Population 
 
Population (million) 44.3 151.1 1300 0.06 
Government 
size 
Government consumption expenditure / GDP  0.15 0.06 0.76 0.02 
Openness 
 
Trade/GDP 0.77 0.51 4.56 0.11 
Rate of industry Value-added of industry / GDP 0.30 0.10 0.78 0.01 
 Instrumental variables     
French legal 
origin dummy 
--- --- --- --- --- 
British legal 
origin dummy 
--- --- --- --- --- 
Share of 
Catholic 
Share of population that is Catholic 
 
0.39 0.37 0.97 0 
Note: CORR_WD is the value between 1996 and 2008. All other variables show the values for 1984–2008. 
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Table 2. Frequency of technological disasters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
disasters 
Frequency % 
0 1,574 56.21 
1 517 18.46 
2 243 8.68 
3 141 5.04 
4 77 2.75 
5 49 1.75 
6 33 1.18 
7 27 0.96 
8 22 0.79 
9 23 0.82 
10 15 0.54 
11 8 0.29 
12 5 0.18 
13 5 0.18 
14 4 0.14 
15 4 0.14 
16 6 0.21 
17 1 0.04 
18 1 0.04 
19 7 0.25 
20 38 1.36  
Total 2,800 100 
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Table 3. Negative binominal estimation (annual disasters is a dependent variable) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICRG 
corruption 
–0.13*** 
(-4.28) 
–0.09*** 
(–4.28) 
  
World Bank 
corruption 
  –0.22*** 
(–3.42) 
–0.21*** 
(–3.10) 
GDP –0.04*** 
(–2.97) 
–0.13*** 
(–8.18) 
–0.14*** 
(–4.64) 
–0.19*** 
(–5.32) 
Population 
 
0.003*** 
(3.63) 
–0.001 
(–1.35) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
–0.002 
(–1.44) 
Government 
size 
–3.70*** 
(–3.33) 
–3.40*** 
(–3.16) 
–0.80 
(–0.46) 
–1.51 
(–0.84) 
Openness 
 
0.51** 
(2.58) 
–0.58** 
(–2.46) 
0.33 
(1.04) 
0.10 
(0.36) 
Rate of 
industry 
0.007 
(0.60) 
0.02*** 
(2.91) 
0.008 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(1.34) 
Constant 
 
0.27 
(0.60) 
0.84* 
(1.94) 
0.40 
(0.76) 
0.41 
(0.72) 
Country 
dummies3 
Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Year 
dummies3 
No Yes No Yes 
Wald  test 
(p-value) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 1873 1873 1035 1035 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means dummies are not included and ―Yes‖ means dummies are included. 
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Table 4. Negative binominal estimation (5-year-average disasters is a dependent variable)  
 (1) (2) 
ICRG 
corruption 
–0.11** 
(–1.97) 
–0.21*** 
(–3.43) 
GDP –0.02 
(–1.28) 
–0.13*** 
(–7.27) 
Population 
 
0.004** 
(2.59) 
–0.0007 
(–0.74) 
Government 
size 
–4.13** 
(–2.33) 
–3.55** 
(–2.46) 
Openness 
 
0.59** 
(2.18) 
–0.55 
(–1.48) 
Rate of 
industry 
–0.002 
(–0.25) 
0.02** 
(2.46) 
Constant 
 
0.57 
(1.02) 
1.14** 
(2.43) 
Country 
dummies3 
Yes Yes 
Year 
dummies3 
No Yes 
Wald  test 
(p-value) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 
Observations 449 449 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means dummies are not included and ―Yes‖ means dummies are included.  
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Table 5. IV Poisson estimation (5-year-average disasters is a dependent variable: instruments interacted with time dummies)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)4 (5)4  (6)4 
ICRG 
corruption 
–1.44*** 
(–4.63) 
–2.50*** 
(–4.40) 
–1.35*** 
(–3.50) 
–1.07*** 
(–3.59) 
–0.81** 
(–2.14) 
–1.07*** 
(–3.30) 
GDP –0.02 
(–1.00) 
–0.22** 
(–2.45) 
–0.13** 
(–2.03) 
0.12*** 
(4.26) 
0.10*** 
(3.05) 
0.09*** 
(3.65) 
Population 
 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.004*** 
(4.80) 
0.003*** 
(6.43) 
0.001*** 
(4.89) 
0.001*** 
(5.26) 
0.001*** 
(5.76) 
Government 
size 
–22.2*** 
(–4.19) 
–32.7*** 
(–4.08) 
–21.9*** 
(–3.93) 
4.27* 
(1.90) 
3.15 
(1.26) 
4.53* 
(1.87) 
Openness 
 
–0.72** 
(–2.23) 
–0.95 
(–1.11) 
–0.24 
(–0.51) 
–1.46*** 
(–7.64) 
–1.47*** 
(–8.83) 
–1.17*** 
(–6.09) 
Rate of 
industry 
0.007 
(0.31) 
–0.008 
(–0.28) 
–0.007 
(–0.33) 
0.03** 
(2.22) 
0.02* 
(1.87) 
0.03** 
(2.16) 
Constant 
 
10.4*** 
(3.99) 
12.5*** 
(4.39) 
7.02*** 
(3.94) 
1.45 
(1.42) 
0.77 
(0.71) 
1.40 
(1.37) 
Country 
dummies3 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Period 
dummies3 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Instrumental  
variable 
(1) French 
legal origin 
dummy* 
period dummy 
(2) British 
legal origin 
dummy* 
period dummy  
(3) Share of 
Catholic* 
period dummy 
(1) French 
legal origin 
dummy* 
period dummy 
(2) British 
legal origin 
dummy* 
period dummy  
 
(1) Share of 
Catholic* period 
dummy 
(1) French legal 
origin dummy 
(2) British legal 
origin dummy  
(3) Share of 
Catholic 
 
(1) French legal 
origin dummy 
(2) British legal 
origin dummy 
(1) Share of 
Catholic 
 
 
Wald  test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
  29 
(p-value) 
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449 
1. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
3. ―No‖ means dummies are not included and ―Yes‖ means dummies are included.  
4. In columns (4)–(6), Africa and Asia region dummies are included to control for area-specific effects. However, the results for the year 
dummies and area dummies are not reported to save space. 
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Appendix 1. List of countries used in the analysis 
 
Number Name 
ICRG 
corruption 
World 
Bank 
corruption  
 Number Name 
ICRG 
corruption 
World 
Bank 
corruption  
 
1 Argentina # #  51 Liberia # # 
2 Australia # #  52 Libya # # 
3 Austria # #  53 Luxembourg # # 
4 Bangladesh # #  54 Madagascar # # 
5 Belgium # #  55 Malawi # # 
6 Belize  #  56 Malaysia # # 
7 Benin  #  57 Malta # # 
8 Bolivia # #  58 Mauritania  # 
9 Brazil # #  59 Mexico # # 
10 
Burkina 
Faso 
# #  60 Morocco # # 
11 Burundi  #  61 Nepal  # 
12 Cameroon # #  62 Netherlands # # 
13 Canada # #  63 
New 
Zealand 
# # 
14 Central Africa #  64 Nicaragua # # 
15 Chad  #  65 Niger # # 
16 Chile # #  66 Nigeria # # 
17 China # #  67 Norway # # 
18 Colombia # #  68 Oman # # 
19 
Congo, 
Dem.  
# #  69 Pakistan # # 
20 
Congo, 
Rep. 
#   70 Panama # # 
21 Costa Rica # #  71 
Papua New 
Guinea 
# # 
22 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
# #  72 Paraguay # # 
23 Denmark # #  73 Peru # # 
24 
Dominican 
Rep 
# #  74 Philippines # # 
25 Ecuador # #  75 Portugal # # 
26 Egypt #   76 Puerto Rico  # 
27 El Salvador # #  77 Rwanda  # 
28 Fiji  #  78 Senegal # # 
29 Finland # #  79 Seychelles  # 
  31 
30 France # #  80 
Sierra 
Leone 
# # 
31 Gabon # #  81 Singapore # # 
32 Georgia  #  82 South Africa # # 
33 Ghana # #  83 Spain # # 
34 Greece # #  84 Sri Lanka # # 
35 Guatemala # #  85 Sudan # # 
36 Guyana # #  86 Sweden # # 
37 Haiti # #  87 Switzerland # # 
38 Honduras # #  88 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
#  
39 Hong Kong #   89 Thailand # # 
40 Hungary # #  90 Togo # # 
41 India # #  91 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
# # 
42 Indonesia # #  92 Tunisia # # 
43 Ireland # #  93 
United 
Kingdom 
# # 
44 Israel # #  94 
United 
States 
# # 
45 Italy # #  95 Uruguay # # 
46 Japan # #  96 
Venezuela, 
RB 
#  
47 Kenya # #  97 Zambia # # 
48 S. Korea #   98 Zimbabwe # # 
49 Kuwait # #      
50 Lesotho  #      
Note: # means that observations are included in the sample used for the estimation. 
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